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Applying Economic Concepts to Defense ProblemsIncreasing Returns in Military
Production Functions
MALCOLM W. HOAG
THE RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA
I
Juxtaposing two authoritative quotations, perhaps bizarrely, can serve
to pose the central issue for this paper, and perhaps a related one as
well: First, "In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force
(two, three, four, and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's
strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them
out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net."' Second,
"Approaching the problem [of allocating resources within the Depart-
ment of Defense] from the first point of view—getting the most defense
from a given level of resources—we work in terms of marginal rates
of transformation and substitution. Approaching the problem from the
second point of view—achieving a given level of defense at the least
cost, which is the way Secretary McNamara prefers to look at the
problem—we work in terms of marginal products and marginal costs
in order to help the top decision-maker choose the appropriate level of
resources." 2
Thefirst quotation is taken from Mao Tse-tung, but it could easily
be paralleled from Western military sources. Mr. Hitch here expresses
also what has come to be an orthodox view about the new defense
economics, to which he and but a small staff within the Defense De-
NOTE:Anyviews expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should
not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the
official opinion or policy of any, of its governmental or private research sponsors.
'Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Eng. ed., Peking, 1961, Vol. V, p. 161.
2CharlesJ. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, Berkeley, 1965, p. 52.4 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
partment contributed so much. There is no inconsistency between
these quotations, but there is a contrast.
Mao's statement is typical in its concentration upon an enemy and
the choice of strategy and tactics to defeat him; analytically, it is con-
cerned with conflict situations, and numerically with totals. This state-
ment by Mr. Hitch can be almost as profitably applied to peaceful
governmental activities where, bureaucratic conflict aside, there is no
enemy; analytically, it applies best to small variations of choice within a
given framework, and thus, numerically, to increments. The central
issue for this paper can be put in terms of this contrast: Where and
why does analytic marginalism apply well to military problems, and
where not and why? Consequently when must economic analysis es-
tablish a relevant resource level before applying marginal cost/effec-
tiveness tests? Given this central focus, the related problem is almost
automatically treated: How can we improve mutual understanding and
communication between military professionals and the civilian analysts
of military problems who, although they are for the most part not
economists by training, are applying economic principles in their quanti-
tative tests?
Both of these questions arise, above all, in determining what aggre-
gate military "requirements" are to be, as distinct from determining
which among competing alternative weapon systems or forces is to ful-
fill a given requirement. They arise when the scale of military opera-
tions for a particular theater or function is itself brought into question,
and therefore the total budget for it.
'I
Before turning to such cases, it is appropriate to acknowledge, at least
briefly, how importantly economic analysis has contributed, and can
contribute, to improving choices among competing alternatives to meet
a stipulated requirement, and to clarifying judgments about the issues
involved in choosing a "requirement." It can contribute in many ways,
of which the least tangible but perhaps most important is in stretching
imaginations about what the proper alternatives are. Economists are
very abstract and general when they deal with such lofty concepts as
social welfare functions, or production functions for that matter. What
in practice are extraordinarily diverse service inputs are typically aggre-Increasing Returns in Production Functions 5
gated in a highly arbitrary manner, even when programming or ac-
tivity analysis techniques are employed to handle far more variables
than capital and labor alone. Yet if the arbitrariness is a defect, the
vision of the production process as a whole, and the attempt to struc-
ture input relationships for it, are virtues.
The administrator at the plant or base level, or the engineer, will of
necessity avoid this kind of arbitrariness, which is his strength, but at
the understandable cost of a narrower perspective. Faced with the
problem of determining how better to accomplish a given military task,
such a professional may go astray in one of two opposite directions. He
may try to drive to, or even beyond, technology's outer limits in order
to obtain maximum performance, regardless of opportunity costs; or, on
the other hand, he may apply too narrow and restrictive a cost con-
straint. For all his other faults, the economist is not nearly so likely to
err in these directions. While he can do more, the economist has much
to contribute in countering these errors by general diagnosis and spe-
cific example. Repeated examples in practice will be needed, it can safely
be forecast, for the intuitive appeal of the one error is deeply rooted in
tradition and emotion as well as reason, while the appeal of the other
rests in ease and practicality.
To ignore or depreciate opportunity costs in choosing among military
alternatives is a practice that an economist may rightly deplore, but
with which he must sympathize up to a point. No counterpart in non-
military pursuits is likely to have as plausible a rationale. Perhaps the
closest equivalent among commercial examples would be the instance
where a firm could, by virtue of but a small qualitative improvement
over the products of its competitors, capture a far larger share of the
market and spread largely fixed costs over its expanded production.
Yet where a market is so structured that such opportunities exist, a
high monetary reward for qualitative improvement is likely to be ap-
parent to managers, even if very uncertainly estimated, and they may
•therefore be perfectly willing to accept high costs for attempts at su-
perior quality.
But military improvements cannot be assessed in dollars against the
test of an impersonal market mechanism, but rather must somehow be
tested by planning staffs within the context of hypothetical future con-
tingencies that one hopes will never arise. Such contexts may well put
great premiums upon small quality differentials. To increase the accu-6 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
rate range of a gun by a small amount may matter little, because
virtually all relevant battle is likely to take place well within existing
ranges anyway. Surveillance problems about what to shoot at may
dominate the range problem. Or it may matter very much, because in
many probable situations the increased range would permit one's forces
to fire effectively while staying out of range of enemy fire. Which is it?
How do you know? Or change the example to another commonly
cited one, greater speed for aircraft that may engage in air-to-air com-
bat. To have a small speed margin that gives you the choice to flee or
pursue successfully, but that denies either choice to your enemy, may
likewise be extremely important. Or it may not, because air-to-air
duels that would exploit this advantage are no longer very relevant.
Again, which is it?
One thing is certain: Men who have fought in wars where they saw
that some particular small qualitative advantages yielded a great edge
in combat are going to have a most understandable bias toward high
performance, and hang the costs. Economic argument is impeccable
to the effect that real resource constraints will always be present, taking
their most pronounced form in war rather than in peace, to such an
extent that one military claimant can gain resources only at the expense
of another, and hence that opportunity costs should be measured. But
this logic runs directly counter to deep military biases. Lectures on
economic fundamentals will be necessary, but insufficient to overcome
these biases.
Success in overcoming these biases will only be approached through
continued practice: "The question is not whether three units of alter-
native A are preferred to three units of alternative B, whose quality per
unit is smaller. The question is whether two units of A are preferred to
three units of alternative B in combat, for these combinations are of
equal cost." Patience will be strained on both sides as the natural answer
is reiterated: "As to type, A is preferred; as to quantity, three units are
required." The economist in this dialogue needs, beyond perhaps an
unaccustomed patience and a willingness to dwell on recurring funda-
mentals rather than move on to intellectually more challenging refine-
ments, an understanding of both the reasons for this obdurate reply and
the possible good sense in a different one that questions the given
scale: "Neither of these equal-cost combinations is very relevant, but
here is why (1) an alternative comparison between three units of A andIncreasing Returns in Production Functions 7
four and one half units of B would be relevant, and (2) why we prefer
the one to the other of these equal-cost combinations."
Misunderstandings and apprehensions by the military professional
can be allayed if he perceives that the economists not only are troubling
him for good reason, but for equally good reason are simultaneously
criticizing those weapons system designers who, by imposing cost cr1-
teria that are too narrow, penalize future military performance unduly.
Fin.ding and indicting such narrowness is easy, although it must be
emphasized that the appropriate constructive correction is hard. Favored
relevant examples are supplied by ordnance: an improved bomb, shell,
gun, rocket, or the like. Compare one of these with its predecessor in
field tests that simulate combat conditions, and it may be fairly well
determined that fifty bombs, say, of the new type will accomplish what
it would take one hundred of the old to do. But fifty of the new bombs
may well cost far more than twice as much as one hundred of the old.
In practice, of course, the cost estimate for the new ordnance would
extend over an uncertain range and might be biased downward, rather
than be known precisely. Comparative effectiveness would be still more
uncertain and difficult to measure, because relative effectiveness could
be expected to differ markedly in different contingencies, whose relative
probabilities of occurrence are not known. This oversimplified discus-
sion, however, bypasses these vital qualifications, and presumes that
relative bomb costs have been determined to be 2: 1, while ordnance
effectiveness has been determined to be less than 2: 1 in relevant con-
tingencies.
Yet to divide ordnance effectiveness by cost so measured for the
new and the old, and find the new to be ruled out by cost/effectiveness
criteria, is obviously wrong. The military professional will know in-
tuitively that it is wrong. If he incorrectly thinks that Department of
Defense systems analysts use cost/effectiveness criteria this way, his re-
sistance to any and all measures of opportunity costs within the military
establishment will be strengthened. If, on the contrary, he sees DOD
systemsanalysts reversing such results, his inclination to understand and
use relevant opportunity cost measures will be reinforced.
For this hypothetical example, psychological reinforcement and pro-
curement efficiency can be both easily, and yet importantly, served.
Bombs that are twice as effective should permit fewer airplane sorties
to be flown to accomplish a given task, and at the least the likely savings8 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
in very expensive planes must be estimated as well as the relatively
trivial addition in bomb procurement costs. A first approximate measure
of this savings is likely to reverse the cost/effectiveness finding de-
cisively, and lead to a decision that the new bomb will replace the old.
Sound military intuition will be confirmed. Or reverse the standard test,
holding a total budget constant while permitting aircraft funds to be
diverted to the improved bombs as long as this substitution enhances
military capability, and the same result will obtain in a procedure that
the economist finds analytically equivalent, but which has greater mili-
tary appeal.
Finding such examplesin practice, where carryingsubstitution
analysis one level higher yields decisive results, is fortunate. But the
easy substitution analysis may not be decisive, for the easily calculable
first-order savings in complementary inputs made possible by the new
ordnance may not be enough to offset the additional ordnance costs.
Such cases, in principle, then raise the dilemma between analyses that
are tractably narrow but suspect, and those that would be definitively
thorough in scope if only they were practicable. To test whether a
sufficient case for the new ordnance can be made, it may be necessary
to consider the full offsetting savings that it would make possible in
supporting facilities as well as aircraft. The counsel of perfection is to
adapt future operational concepts and tactics that exploit the poten-
tialities of the new bomb to their fullest; to redesign bomb-carriers,
bases or aircraft carriers, and all other support facilities accordingly;
and then, in a necessarily very extended, complicated, and uncertain
analysis, see whether offsetting savings in nonordnance costs would be
sufficient. Nor, in principle, would even such a large scope be ade-
quate. If the redesigned air systems are very different and much better,
should the balance between the air and the partly complementary
ground and naval arms be reexamined? For this balance, do income
effects from weapon substitution run counter to, and more than offset,
substitution effects? For the counsel of analytic perfection, there is no
end.
The central conceptual problem, to borrow both the name and sub-
stance from its notable exposition by Hitch and McKean,3 is to deter-
mine a level of suboptimization that is neither too small nor imprac-
C. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, esp. Chap. 7.Increasing Returns in Production Functions 9
tically large for the problem at hand. The related central task is to in-
vent, design, and redesign alternatives, or combinations of alternatives,
that will permit analysis to be carried in a practical way to higher
levels of suboptimization, and yet yield dominant or near dominant
results. Because these themes have been well developed elsewhere,4
they need not be elaborated here. Among the professionals, the econ-
omist can claim a comparative advantage in grasping the conceptual
problem, and he should exploit it. He knows that one cannot be grandi-
ose, and put numbers in all the variables of a social welfare function.
Yet from his Sophomore days at college onward he also learns that par-
ticular allocations may be determined to fall inefficiently within the
transformation frontier. Directions for reallocation may then be safely
found within the restrictions of Paretian optimality; or, where they ex-
ceed these restrictions, their distributive or other implications can at
least be made explicit. These are appreciable conceptual advantages.
The economist can claim no comparable comparative advantage in in-
venting or redesigning concrete alternatives, other than the sensitivity
he ought to have about the goals for system design, although this may
be enough to overcome any comparative disadvantage. Since on balance
the economist has much to contribute to military as well as to other
applied areas, he can expect his concepts to spread within the military
profession. But he also has much to learn, especially where overex-
posure to nonmilitary examples may have overly habituated him to
marginalism.
III
For military as well as nonmilitary applications, efficiency tests for
equal returns at the margin may be relevant, and may suffice except for
determining a budgetary scale in value terms. Transformation functions
may be shown to have simplifying convexity properties; returns to
scale may be shown to be decreasing over relevant ranges. But the per-
plexities for choice that increasing returns pose are more likely to arise
in military applications, plus the complications inherent in adversary
relationships. At the very least, cases that fall within a two-by-two
Ibid., A. W. Wohistetter, "Analysis and Design of Conflict Systems," in
E. S. editor, Analysis for Military Decisions, Chicago, 1964.10 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
matrix that reflects these considerations need to be considered: decreas-
ing returns to scale vs. increasing returns on the one hand, and direct
military counters in kind to enemy actions vs. indirect counters. Of the
resultant four cases, the decreasing returns and direct counter case is
obviously the easiest to handle, especially in the static degenerate case
where enemy military counters can be ignored.
All of us tend to use the simplest case for expository purposes, and to
exploit it in practical application whenever possible. The favored ex-
ample, derived from its central role in strategic force calculations, in-
volves the allocation of strategic missiles to fixed targets.5 Where the
subset of such targets is taken that comprises enemy cities, the problem
assumes an especially straightforward form. Because no society has yet
shown any appreciable disposition toward dispersing urban areas as a
means of reducing vulnerability to nuclear attack, a dynamic formula-
tion to allow for interaction over time between missile allocations and
this subset of enemy targets as to number and location is not needed.
Nor is such a formulation as yet much needed for the "hardness" of
cities, given the pace of civil defense programs, although this assump-
tion must be more tentative. Finally, for the moment, calculations that
reflect extensive antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses around cities are
probably not needed. The complications that such defenses introduce can
be considered later, as an especially pertinent example for the future.
Given such a target list, assigning a fixed number of missiles among
the cities so as to maximize desired damage can be taken as the
first and recurring allocation problem. As the operational planner
moves beyond the obvious assignments of at least one missile to each
of a few key cities, he will face diminishing returns for each additional
missile that is assigned. There will always be a less rewarding extensive
margin, since a smaller city can be added to the list. Also there will
always be an intensive margin, for an additional missile assigned to a
large city will both increase expected damage if all assigned missiles
arrive and hedge against the possibility that previously assigned missiles
will not be reliable. An optimal assignment will find marginal expected
returns roughly equivalent at each assigned target, although average re-
5Forexample, Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense; and Statement of Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Subcommittee on Department
of Defense. Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1967—71 Defense Program and
1967 Defense Budget, p. 47.Increasing Returns in Production Functions 11
turns will be higher for the large cities, with a presumption that any
added missiles would be divided among them at lessened marginal re-
turns.
Let the defender add antiballistic missile (ABM) local defenses around
some of his cities, however, and the offense planner's problem will be
complicated. The defender will naturally tend to cluster such ABM
installations around cities in proportion to the value he places upon
them, seeking to make an attack on each defended city no more re-
warding, as measured by the offense in terms of average damage per
attacking missile, than one on an undefended, less valuable city. If the
defender succeeds, he will lessen expected over-all damage for any
given number of attacking missiles. He will, incidentally, also offset
what would otherwise be diminishing returns to scale over a range for
missiles assigned by the offense to defended cities. If the attacker now
disposes of the same total number of missiles, will he cultivate the ex-
tensive margin further by attacking more undefended cities? Or will
he concentrate more upon defended cities (the intensive margin) in
order to override the defenses by force of numbers, and consequently
attack fewer undefended cities? He may do the latter, which then yields
the paradox that the way to defend small cities is to strengthen the de-
fenses of the large ones. Counterintuitive as this possibility may at first
seem, it can be put in the economist's terms as an indirect income
effect for the attacker, since he is forced to a lower level of damage that,
like the direct income affect of a lower budget for missiles, will induce
greater concentration. This effect may overshadow the substitution effect
in its tendency to replace defended with undefended targets.
The interactions among missile offenses and defenses that are dif-
ferent in kind extend so much further in their complications, however,
that it is best to consider other basic situations first. Clearly the ABM
planner is dealing with decisions now that will alter defenses years from
now. Consequently he will be less interested in how the enemy might
react in terms of assigning a given number of attacking missiles than in
how he is likely to react in terms of expanding his offense force or, more
generally, altering its characteristics. Can he react in such a way as to
negate the efficacy of the defenses? Is he especially likely to do so be-
cause the costs to the attacker will be markedly lower than the costs
to the defender; will the terms of trade, as it were, be favorable to the12 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
offense? These will tend to be the dominant questions, although the
problem of missile assignment against any given defense remains a
perennial related one.
Iv
Less novel and complex interactions between opposed forces than is
the case for ABM defenses can better illustrate the most fundamental
reasons for increasing physical returns to scale in military applications.
Such interactions arise when forces are designed to meet their counter-
parts directly—naval fleet vs. fleet, army vs. army, or, more concretely
still,fighter plane vs. fighter plane, where the anticipated situation
takes the form of a duel. Then two powerful reasons for increasing
return apply: First, any firepower advantages in combat are likely to
yield an edge that is more than linear in proportion; second, any per-
ceived advantage in size or quality islikely to be multiplied asit
redounds favorably upon the relative morale of opposed forces. Because
this second advantage is especially difficult to estimate—"the moral is
to the material as three is to one," is a slogan, not a finding—it tends to
be ignored in quantitative analyses, which put it at zero; while itis
sometimes elevated to overriding status in nonbudgetary qualitative ap-
praisals, as if valued near infinity. The latter approach is clearly un-
tenable, but the deficiency in the former also needs to be noted.
In contrast, firepower advantages lend themselves to rigorous quanti-
tative formulation. One early formulation remains preeminent, for at
one and the same time it addresses itself to the central combat rela-
tionship, expresses itin mathematically convenient form, and, once
clearly expounded, appeals to intuitive common sense. Lanchester's
Law—"The fighting strength of a force may be broadly defined as pro-
portional to the square of its numerical strength multiplied by the
fighting value of its individual units." °—has subsequently been ex-
tensively criticized and modified in various ways for applications to
particular combat operations. Yet it has survived as the simplest analytic
expression for a basic tendency that has been shown to apply when
tested against past combat engagements.
Mathematically, Lanchester expressed expected casualties over time
6FrederickW. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare, London, 1916, p.48.Increasing Returns in Production Functions 13
for opposed "blue" and "red" forces in differential equations for each,
with quality and quantity for these forces as functional variables. He
put in model form a dominant characteristic that technology had al-
ready long since established for battle—that accurate firepower could
be brought to bear from sizable distances, and therefore that the
firepower of many individuals or units might be brought to bear upon
one enemy individual or unit. Hence the intuitive appeal of something
approximating his "N-square Law." Where aggregate firepower would
be directly matched in battle, a numerical inferiority would penalize
one both offensively and defensively. If outnumbered two to one by
forces of equal quality, for example, you would expect to lose about
twice as many units in a first volley. Consequently the beginning of a
second volley would find you outnumbered by more than two to one,
and so on through subsequent volleys that would produce a growing
disproportion of forces.
In its various modified formulations, Lanchester's Law has impor-
tant long-term implications for allocations among alternative forces, al-
though its immediate applications are more directly to military opera-
tions. For short-term strategic and tactical choices, it relates to the
famed Principles of War: to Concentration of Force (or Mass) obviously,
more precisely if more rigidly than in the standard military literature,
since it measures the premium to be placed upon outnumbering the
enemy at points of combat. Less obviously it relates to Maneuver, and
thus to an entire range of subtle skills associated with the art of war.
For if in the short-run the size of the force and associated materiel
must be taken as given, the brute force method for overpowering
your enemy by outproducing him does not apply, while methods to
outwit him do. If by your deception, his lethargy, or whatever, he con-
centrates in the wrong places, while you so maneuver as to achieve
decisive numerical superiority in the right places, over-all success may
be achieved despite aggregate parity or inferiority in size of opposed
forces. In focusing upon firepower as the key quantifiable variable,
Lanchester's Law by no means disputes the evident sense in proposi-
tions that firepower must be made available at relevant locations (Mo-
bility) and that to know which locations are relevant (Intelligence) is
indispensable.
Or the law can easily be put in the context of another Principle of
War that reflects codified common sense, and is closer to traditional14 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
economics, that of Economy of Force. Put the problem for an entire
military campaign in terms of minimizing your expected casualties for
given territorial or other gains, and, following Lanchester, this criterion
will ideally be met by a series of engagements in each of which crushing
numerical superiority is attained. Then, benefiting from the "N-square
Law," your casualties in each engagement will be very low relative to
the opposition, and should accordingly be low for the entire campaign.
This ideal is worth noting because the economist, once persuaded that
increasing returns are in fact likely to apply, will find it in accord with
his maximizing principles. The military professional may not expect this
accord from the economist, since he tends to equate economizing with
parsimony and therefore with a tendency to give a combat operation no
more than it "needs." Against this tendency, paraphrasing from the ac-
count of an observer, one famed Supreme Commander in World War II
gave the apt retort in rejecting calculations for the bare minimum in
required support from an associated service: "Gentlemen, we are not
staging an athletic contest whose aim is an even contest for spectators.
This is war, and I require all the support that you can provide for as
long as this battle may last." Cavalierly as this statement dismissed op-
portunity costs for the support in question, it at the same time redressed
overconcern with them.
For longer-term allocations, opportunity costs may pose real dilemmas
for choice. If forward, local, mobile, defenses are sought in many places,
military objectives will be ambitious since each of these adjectives exacts
its resource toll. In total, the objectives may imply budgets that are
higher than the governments involved are willing to provide. Across-the-
board budgetary restrictions are administratively the simplest means to
reduce proposed military capabilities to relevant total budget levels. Yet
given nonuniform military returns to scale in different places, uniform
budgetary cuts will be nonoptimal; more strongly, given increasing re-
turns to scale for such defenses in several places, uniform cuts would
be decidedly disadvantageous relative to selective cuts that sacrificed such
defenses in one or more places in order to exploit such returns well in
other places.
The clearest examples fit past rather than current possibilities, mostly
for one overriding reason. Now, as at no time in the past, one technically
feasible global strategy can at least be considered that is exempt from
such dilemmas. Protected strategic forces whose missile capabilities ex-Increasing Returns in Production Functions 15
tend to at least half-global range, as is clearly possible when large mis-
sile payloads can be boosted into still more demanding orbits around the
globe, could be procured in quantities sufficient to cover the civil soci-
eties of all prospective enemies; and, more critically, military objectives
might then be taken to be fulfilled. The first element of such a capability
is already foreshadowed: "Thus,...thestrategic missile forces recom-
mended for the FY [Fiscal Year] 1967—7 1period would provide
substantially more force than is required for an Assured Destruction
[civil damage] capability against both the Soviet Union and Communist
China simultaneously."If American security policy were to change
drastically to regard such a capability as sufficient in itself to cover all
contingencies, military planning would be reduced to the missile alloca-
tion and assignment problems that were discussed earlier. Diminishing
returns would be expected almost everywhere, and tests for marginally
equivalent results would suffice to determine solutions to these problems.
Nor would there be any serious problem about scale. Since current stra-
tegic missile coverage extends this far, and covers additional missions
as well—and yet the entire American budget for Strategic Offensive
Forces accounts for only about one-tenth the total defense budget of the
United States 8—relatively small total resources are needed by a nuclear
superpower to be well along the curve of diminishing returns for these
cap abilities everywhere.
Because American policy-makers seek far less violent and more flexible
military capabilities as well, however, the old dilemmas can arise, es-
pecially for what are now called General Purpose (tactical) Forces. They
now arise less clearly than was formerly the case, notably for pre-Worid
War I surface navies. There, minus the complications posed for land
battle by terrain, firepower-squared advantages were so apparent that
Lanchester was led to an extreme observation:"Itisquestionable
whether under any circumstances it can be considered sound strategy
to divide the main battle fleet on which the defense of a country de-
pends." What clearly applied to tactics also governed procurement, con-
spicuously in the Anglo-German naval competition. Great Britain con-
sidered herself compelled to maintain battle fleet superiority, and to
announce so unmistakably that such was her determined intent, despite
Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, p. 49.
SExcludingspecial Vietnam costs. Ibid., p. 213.
Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare, p. 38.16 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
indeterminately high possible costs, that Germany hopefully would be
deterred from pressing toward or beyond naval parity. One military re-
quirement was made paramount.
If Great Britain had considered herself equally threatened in the
Pacific, her central choice problem would have been harder. An Atlantic
fleet that outnumbered its main rival decisively if concentrated, say in
8:5 proportions, would, if divided in 4:5 proportions in each of two
widely separate areas, be critically inferior. Such a disposition of an
existing force could well be the worst of possible choices, with military
strength nowhere strong enough to supply much confidence for firm
diplomacy. How can such a situation be avoided? The straightforward
military requirements answer might be to double total strength, and thus
to seek preponderance in each area. Qualms would arise on the part
of the government, however, not merely about initially doubling costs,
but about whether its clear intent would serve to spur rather than to
deter arms races in one or both of the areas. Rather than move to a
markedly higher. scale, it might choose military superiority in the one
area and accept inferiority in the other as the best among remaining
alternatives.
V
With the disappearance of the battleship, and the extension of indirect
naval combat over the full air, surface, and subsurface range, modern
counterparts for physically increasing returns in direct combat are more
likely to be found in land defense against overt aggression. Those key
adjectives for such defense—forward, local, and mobile—may well, if
taken as governing American military policy over much of the globe,
raise similar dilemmas. Global extension, of course, implies a large scale
of effort, and raises the old issue: How are the resources to be allocated
geographically? If divided among many locales, small peacetime forward
deployments can nonetheless, of course, be made compatible with ef-
fective local defense if prospective enemy capabilities are likewise small.
Or, even if opposed capabilities are larger, economic and yet effective
land defense can be implemented, broadly speaking, by exploiting one or
both of two traditional methods: First, defending commanders may be
allowed wide flexibility as to place and time for battle. Then, for example,Increasing Returns in Production Functions 17
they may choose if necessary to retreat temporarily and trade space for
time. In so doing, they can fight at locations where the terrain naturally
favors the defense and has been made to favor defense still more by
engineering efforts. Then much of an attacker's firepower advantages
may be nullified by superior protection for the defender, while the at-
tacker's logistics are relatively strained. Meanwhile, in the time gained
by such tactics, the potential can be gained for a compensating offensive
as reinforcements flow to the theater. The great programmed increase in
American airlift and sealift capabilities makes such reinforcement now
especially pertinent: "We are now proposing an expanded airlift program
which will provide by FY 1973 an equivalent thirty-day lift capability
from West Coast airfields to Southeast Asia more than ten times greater
than that available in FY 1961." 10Or,second, defending commanders
may try to adapt to a political denial of flexibility, when local govern-
ments refuse to allow the ebb and flow of battle to move widely over
their territory, and insist instead upon an inflexible forward strategy. In
such a case, commanders, knowing the place of battle, however much
they regret enemy knowledge of it, can try ahead of time to make the
terrain as unfavorable to the attacker as possible. They can plan an
area rather than mobile defense, and create a fortified zone to implement
such a defense.
Historical examples abound. Perhaps the most prominent case of the
first type of defense against superior numbers is supplied by the German
Army in its retreat from Russia and Poland in World War II, when in-
opportune standfast edicts from Hitler did not mar its efficacy. A per-
tinent case of the second type of defense is perhaps best supplied today
by South Korea, where large ground forces are prepared to fight in a
partly fortffied zone whose defenses have been strengthened over the
years since the cease-fire. These defenses are more pertinent than the
much more prominent but unjustly maligned Maginot Line because they,
as the Maginot Line was never designed to,'1 stretch the full width of the
possible land front. Moreover, the decisive 1940 attack by the Germans
not only outflanked the Maginot Line to the north, but the Western
allies moved forward to meet it in a series of engagements on terrain
that neither side had prepared. Thus this spectacular campaign illus-
10Statementof Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, p. 125.
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trated neither type of prepared defense, but rather the head-on-collision
that, with roughly 50:50 odds for evenly matched forces, comes closest
to the old naval analogy. Therefore, it comes closest to the simple test
that, for unevenly matched forces, places such premiums upon the fire-
power advantages that can be brought to bear.
Such battle tests might apply in some future contingencies. The most
obvious cases in point are for combat situations that might develop along
lightly guarded portions of Chinese or Soviet borders, while the most
publicized case is NATO's Central Front in Europe. There, geographi-
cally forward defense has been put as a political imperative, and mobile
defense as a military imperative.12 Yet, as one crude quantitative per-
spective, this front extends about four times as long as that in Korea, if
all the bends along the Iron Curtain and the Austrian border are traced
for a literal forward defense, while it is guarded by only about 35 per
cent more ready divisions.'3 Qualitatively, the NATO front lacks the ele-
ments of a fortified zone that have been built in Korea, while "to fight
an effective mobile defense requires greater tactical mobility, more ar-
mour, more conventional firepower and better logistical support than is
found at present.. .[and]some restationing is needed." 14
Putting the Central European forces perspective this way deliberately
overstates the NATO problem in creating an effective local defense. The
South Korean standard is excessive, in all probability, for this different
area, where the Warsaw Bloc also has its great problems. Above all,
NATO outmans the bloc in military forces now,15 and should be able
to convert these inputs to meaningful output advantage. But how? And
how can traditionally conservative military staffs be persuaded, and
through them their governments, that it has been done? Affirmative an-
swers clearly should be possible. Yet if one combines military-preferred
all-mobile units for flexibility, which tends to maximize unit costs, with
politically-preferred inflexibility as to inconvenient place of battle, which
12 General Lemnitzer, address to Western European Assembly, NATO Letter,
July—August 1963, p. 20.
13 The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964—65, London,
1965, estimates 27 divisions for Allied Forces Central Europe (p. 13), and 18
divisions for South Korea's First Army, to which 2 U.S. divisions must be
added (p. 30).
Lemnitzer, Nato Letter.
15 The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964—65, p. 41,
puts total active armed forces at 5,843,500 for NATO, and at 4,425,000 for the
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will tend to generate military demands for more units, the joint re-
source demands for an acceptable answer will be high.16
Even given these conditions, acceptable answers need not extend to
the full requirements that would be traditionally calculated for militarily
"worst case" contingencies; i.e., where the worst combination of enemy
surprise and mass in attack is assumed. In the now fashionable phrase,
it is realistic to plan forces to meet "crisis situations," in which battle is
likely to develop out of a more-or-less symmetric test of nerves over
time, but where neither side is at all likely to risk reflex nuclear over-
retaliation by a "worst case" attack. The probable time in developing
crisis situations permits acceptable economies through total force levels
that incorporate a lessened safety margin against an enemy lead in
mobilizing and in reinforcing forward elements, and through greater re-
liance upon such reserve elements as can be promptly incorporated
within effective units. In addition, the great programmed increase in
American air and sealift capabilities makes forces in the United States
much more quickly available for a NATO front, or any other front, and
these forces have been strengthened. For these reasons, superimposed
upon fundamental Western resource dominance, adequate forward local
defense should be feasible in Central Europe.
Over-all frontal adequacy, nonetheless, remains the relevant test. To
orient planning toward possible crisis situations, even if one imprudently
considers that no single situation is likely to grow to involve more than a
few divisions for a short period, by no means implies that total forces
can be held to anything like such small dimensions. To have only small
forces to mobilize at one place would leave a superior enemy free to
outmobilize NATO at that place, or to bring pressure to bear at un-
defended places elsewhere. Either would worsen rather than improve
bargaining positions in a crisis situation, especially under conditions
where enemy numerical advantages would have multiplied effectiveness.
For the most publicized area for possible local defense, consequently,
marginal analysis that aims at enhanced efficiency for a given total
capability or budget can be highly useful, but doubly insufficient. Re-
sultant force redesign may still fall short of adequacy; and, if it does,
governments may well lack incentives to improve local defenses, even
16Forthis author's discussion of a militarily more efficient alternative, and
its political problems, see "Rationalizing NATO Strategy," World Politics, October
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when dominant solutions can be argued. However much the analyst may
question a "requirements approach" by military planners in this instance,
and rightly deflate some critical estimates, he must respect its fundamental
rationale.
Elsewhere the most apparent examples where forward local defense
poses, or rather would pose, great resource demands, are for exposed
countries that prefer nonalignment and self-defense. Potential allies,
especially the United States, might nonetheless be interested in helping
to provide local defense in some contingencies. But for a subset of
these contingencies, hastily improvised defenses can hardly be expected
to be forward. For noncommitted nations, such is the risk they choose to
run in preference to others, and presumably the matter can be left there.
To be almost equally summary about the position of America's allies
outside NATO, allied preparedness in and behind South Korea appears
to be unique. For the most part, however, others face a distinctly lesser
threat, so that speedy American reinforcements could tip the local bal-
ance of forces still more drastically, and often others are sheltered behind
an ocean barrier that counts vitally. And where possibilities must never-
theless be faced that considerable land space might have to be traded
for time, the space in question is often far less densely populated than
western Europe. Accordingly, less constraining inflexibilities need be
politically imposed upon military planning. For most, although cer-
tainly not all such areas, these circumstances bring requirements for
peacetime deployments, and for critical base and other infrastructure
elements that would permit emergency reinforcement, down to moderate
levels. But they do not eliminate such requirements, and therefore do
not eliminate the possibility that harsh choices must be made among
areas to defend.
VI
Other principal sources for increasing returns in military applications
arise also from geographical concentration, although not in the same
traditional sense, and from production economies of scale. Sometimes
these can combine, as for the problem of antiballistic missile (ABM) de-
fense. To defend only one large city locally with such a defense, to take
an extreme case, makes little sense. An enemy can then shift his attack
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way or another in an effort to penetrate the defenses, or ground-burst
nuclear weapons upwind from the city in an effort to inflict fall-out
casualties within it. If he is free to choose the most promising among
these options, the prospective defense contribution of ABM installa-
tions that are so localized may be small. Yet the installations are bound
to be large and extremely complex, so that they can distinguish probable
missile warheads from decoys, and moreover it cannot be much less
expensive to buy an interceptor missile that must operate with extreme
speed and accuracy than it is to buy an offensive missile. Further, com-
bine small deployment scale with large installation size and inherent
complexity, and with high interceptor unit cost, and it is manifestly un-
economic for many producers to compete for the small market. Even
one producer, or consortium, can hope to lower unit costs only if huge
research and development costs are spread over a sizable market.
Such has been the general perspective that has counselled for either
large-scale ABM operational deployments or none at all, and which to
date in the United States has resulted in a clear choice for none. These
same factors continue to operate, although, judging from Secretary Mc-
Namara's recent testimony, they operate with diminished force.17 On the
demand side, defenses prospectively would be useful against more than
one threat as nuclear weapons spread. Specifically, defenses would be
technically more effective, in all probability, against a future unsophisti-
cated Chinese attack, if deemed necessary against this threat. On the
supply side, the Secretary speaks of "exoatmospheric" interceptor mis-
siles that, as part of ABM complexes, might extend defense ranges sig-
nificantly farther. If ranges are so extended that "local" can become
"area" defenses, with overlapping coverage, an attacker's opportunities
will be significantly narrowed. Against complete area coverage of the
nat:ion, he could neither find undefended cities to hit directly, nor hit
defended cities indirectly by fall-out from undefended impact points.
Consequently again there would be increasing returns to scale in combat,
in this case as gaps in an area defense were closed.
Given the general scope and character of a program for national
defense against nuclear attack, a strategic analyst can examine many
trade-oils among and between components for an ABM system, civil
defense, and bomber defense. Marginal rates of transformation can be
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calculated in terms of likely reductions in damage against alternative pos-
sible attacks, and assessed against marginal costs. Yet again, rewarding
and necessary as these analyses may be, they will be dominated by an-
swers to the big questions: Is a defense needed? Against whom? Should
an addition be made that would necessarily be large in scale, like an
ABM system?
Answers will be assessed in terms of their likely impact upon the
strategic programs of likely enemies, with all the uncertainty that this
procedure implies. Unlike the comparative simplicity of the pre-World
War I naval race used earlier as an example, enemy counters would
more likely take a different form. Their answer to a new defense will
probably be a more sophisticated offense, rather than something as sim-
ple and comparatively verifiable as a matching defense. Nor are the
enemy's partly predictable reactions the only ones to take prominently
into account. Would a new defense strengthen the credibility of Amer-
ican nuclear guarantees in allied eyes because it promised to reduce
damage in the event of nuclear war in the United States? Or would it
impair the credibility of American guarantees because it seemed to
demonstrate excessive American fear of nuclear attack, and remind al-
lies of their greater exposure? Whatever the answers to these difficult
general questions, they are highly relevant to very aggregative decisions;
and these aggregative decisions, in turn, will make some marginal analyses
irrelevant and others highly useful.
For the production economies of scale that would still seem to apply
for ABM defenses, and for many other military applications as well, little
need be said to an informed audience. For many expensive military
items the additional number which must be produced to constitute a
revolutionary technological change is minute when compared with a
civilian item like an automobile. It was early recognized that a "learn-
ing curve" tended to apply to airframe production for this reason, with
unit costs declining in a fairly predictable pattern as production ex-
panded.'8 Today, concentrated sources of supply tend still more to pre-
dominate. One spectacular example is the F-i ii (TFX), which in dif-
ferent versions is designed to be the advanced tactical fighter bomber
for both the United States Navy and Air Force, a strategic bomber for
the Air Force, and probably for the services of allied nations as well.
18HaroldAsher, Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe Industry, The
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Small production runs and great technical complexity combine to create
concentration. Or one could take examples from space programs. How
such economic concentration can be made compatible with a prudent
spreading of great technological uncertainties among many research and
development competitors is a highly pertinent problem, but one that
fortunately falls outside of the scope of this paper.
Here it suffices to affirm that prominent production economies of
scale do apply with special frequency in military applications, and that
they can join with combat conditions to create increasing returns to scale
that demand wide-ranging nonmarginal analyses of military alterna-
tives. Many especially challenging problems are consequently posed for
military systems analysis. The problems demand very broad analyses that
can take scale and complementarity factors into account, and yet that
must be reasonably solidly based upon many component studies. Mar-
ginal and supramarginal trade-offs ought somehow to be concurrently
or at least consistently appraised, which is a very tall order. None of us as
individuals, or as members of but one relevant profession, can be com-
placent about our abilities to undertake such analyses; but economic
and other relevant bodies of theory can certainly combine with military
insights to provide a basis for improved choices.